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knowledge by acquaintance
The distinction between "knowledge by acquaintance" and "knowledge by description"〔Lazerowitz (p.403) prefers "direct knowledge" and "indirect knowledge" for "knowledge by acquaintance" and "knowledge by description" respectively. The pursuit of knowledge by acquaintance is always susceptible to what James (1890, pp.196–197) labelled "the psychologist's fallacy": namely, the psychologists' tendency to confuse their analyses of subjective experience with the nature of reality ("the great snare of the psychologist is the confusion of his own standpoint with that of the mental fact about which he is making his report").
Parker (1945b, p.458) holds the strong opinion that the term "knowledge by description" is extremely misleading. He advocated using "knowledge merely by description".〕 was promoted by Bertrand Russell (notably in his 1905 paper ''On Denoting''). Russell was extremely critical of the equivocal nature of the word ''know'', and believed that the equivocation arose from a failure to distinguish between the two fundamentally different types of knowledge.
==Grote==
In 1865, philosopher John Grote distinguished between what he described as "''knowledge of acquaintance''" and "''knowledge-about''". Grote noted that these distinctions were made in many languages. He cited Greek (''γνωναι'' and ''ειδεναι''), Latin (''noscere'' and ''scire''), German (''kennen'' and ''wissen''), and French (''connaître'' and ''savoir'') as examples.
Grote's "knowledge of acquaintance" is far better known today as "knowledge by acquaintance" following Russell's decision to change the preposition in a paper that he read to the Aristotelian Society on 6 March 1911.
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